- Title
- The qua-problem and meaning scepticism
- Creator
- Douglas, Samuel Paul
- Relation
- Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations Vol. 17, p. 77-78
- Publisher Link
- http://dx.doi.org/10.22381/LPI1720184
- Publisher
- Addleton Academic Publishers
- Resource Type
- journal article
- Date
- 2018
- Description
- When considering potential solutions to meaning-scepticism, Kripke (1982) did not consider a causal-theoretic approach. Kusch (2006) has argued that this is due to the qua-problem. I consider Kusch’s criticism of Maddy (1984) and McGinn (1984) before offering a different way to solve the qua-problem, one that is not susceptible to sceptical attack. If this solution is successful, at least one barrier to using a causal theory to refute Kripke’s scepticism is removed.
- Subject
- philosophy of language; causal theory; Kripke; meaning skepticism; meaning; reference
- Identifier
- http://hdl.handle.net/1959.13/1346379
- Identifier
- uon:29851
- Identifier
- ISSN:1841-2394
- Rights
- © 2018 Addleton Academic Publishers. Douglas, Samuel Paul (2018). “The Qua-Problem and Meaning Scepticism,” Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations 17: 71–78.
- Language
- eng
- Full Text
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